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Abstract: This study outlines present US policy on arms sales to
Taiwan. It also examines options an American administration may
wish to consider to address the growing military imbalance in the
Taiwan Strait. The author argues that some new thinking may be required if Washington, Beijing, and Taipei hope to realize a peaceful
resolution of the “Taiwan question.”

A

lthough the United States has long recognized the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of
all China, it maintains a robust military relationship with the
Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan). Indeed, in 2011, Taiwan
was the largest purchaser of US defense items and services in the world.1
Despite America’s support, however, the military balance across the
Taiwan Strait—in terms of personnel, force structure, arms, and developments in military doctrine—continues to shift in China’s favor. This
study outlines the present US policy on arms sales to Taiwan; it also
examines several options a US administration may wish to consider to
address the growing military imbalance between Taiwan and the PRC.
Some new thinking may be required if Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
hope to realize a “peaceful resolution” of the Taiwan issue.

US Policy

On 15 December 1978, the United States announced the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC, which became effective
1 January 1979.2 To guide “unofficial” relations with Taipei, the United
States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA “plus the
so-called Six Assurances and the Three Communiqués, form the foundation of our overall approach [to Taiwan’s security].”3 In some respects,
these documents appear contradictory. When one adds official US
statements, proclamations, and secret assurances to the mix, American
policy appears more confusing. This confusion has contributed to quarrels over policy—particularly arms transfers. The TRA commits the
United States to sell Taiwan the weapons and defense services necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. However, in the
1982 US-China Joint Communiqué, Washington promised to reduce
its sales of arms to Taiwan gradually, leading to a final resolution. The
TRA also mandates that the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of arms transfers; however, members of
1     William Lowther, “Taiwan Still a Top Buyer of US Arms,” Taipei Times, December 22, 2011,
http://www.Taipeitimes.com.
2     To achieve normalization, Washington acquiesced to Beijing’s three long-standing demands:
(1) termination of formal diplomatic relations with the ROC, (2) abrogation of the 1954 US-ROC
Mutual Defense Treaty, and (3) removal of all US troops from Taiwan.
3     Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of the US Department of State’s Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in Why Taiwan
Matters, Part II, October 4, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/.
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Congress often complain they have not been consulted.4 Meanwhile, the
“Six Assurances,” a series of commitments made by President Ronald
Reagan, appear to abrogate the 1982 US-China Joint Communiqué.
However, some experts charge that recent US administrations have violated the pledge not “to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding
arms sales to Taiwan.”5 For example, on 16 July 2008, Admiral Timothy
Keating, then PACOM Commander, reportedly confirmed that he had
engaged in “discussions with PRC officials about their objections” to
arms sales.6 Since that time, other high-ranking US officials have made
similar statements when discussing which weapons might be sold to
Taiwan.7
The TRA does not obligate Taiwan to allocate a specific amount of
the resources for its own defense. Taiwan’s military budget as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has dropped from 3.8 percent in
1994 to 2.1 percent in 2013, and from 24.3 percent of total government
spending to 16.2 percent in the same period.8 A Congressional study
observed that the influence of Taiwan’s domestic politics over defense
decisions was “undoubtedly unforeseen at the time of the TRA’s enactment [and] raises potentially consequential questions for Congress.”9 As
one exasperated US official complained, “we cannot help defend you, if
you cannot defend yourself.”10
Perhaps most contentious is the accusation that America has “abandoned” Taiwan. A former US Department of State official has charged
that the United States has “cut Taiwan loose.”11 Others quarrel with
such claims. One study contends that “‘the Obama administration has
been a solid friend of Taiwan in support of this policy, including selling
unprecedentedly (sic) large packages of arms sales.12 Moreover, Hillary
Clinton, then US Secretary of State, boasted that “we’ve strengthened
our unofficial relationship with Taiwan.”13
Naturally, PRC analysts share these assessments. They charge that
“US arms sales to Taiwan during Obama’s eight years in office (20092017) will account for one-third of total arms sales to Taiwan since China
and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1979. Obama

4     Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 (Washington DC: Congressional
Research Service, July 3, 2013), 43.
5     Ibid.
6     Ibid.
7     For more information, see William Lowther, “F-16 Sale Subject to PRC Sensitivities: Gates,” Taipei
Times, June 4, 2011, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/06/04/2003504919;
William Lowther, “Panetta’s Praise of PRC Raises Concern,” Taipei Times, October 27, 2011, www.
taipeitimes.com.
8     Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, July 23, 2013), 33-34.
9     Kerry Dumbaugh, Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications,
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2009), 4.
10     Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990, 28.
11     See testimony of John Tkacik, Senior Fellow and Director of the Future Asia Project,
International Assessment and Strategy Center, in Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Investigating the Chinese Threat, Part One: Military and Economic Aggression, in Federal News Service, March
28, 2012, in Lexis/Nexis.
12     Jacob Stokes and Nina Hachigian, US-China Relations in an Election Year: Taking the Long View
in a Season of Heated Rhetoric (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, March 2012), 26.
13     William Lowther, “US Has ‘Strengthened’ Relationship with Taiwan: Clinton,” Taipei Times,
March 9, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com.
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is the only US president to twice approve arms sales to Taiwan.”14 Yet,
ROC military authorities often express concerns about “delays and price
increases” for various defense programs, and claim Washington is treating Taipei like a “sucker” and a “fool” by “jacking up” the prices for
military hardware and trying to sell “piles of junk.” 15

US Arms Sales and the Military Imbalance

Relations between Taipei and Beijing have improved enormously
since Ma Ying-jeou was elected ROC president in 2008; and US military
authorities are “encouraged” by recent developments. Admiral Robert
F. Willard, Commander of the US Pacific Command, said that, “as they
(PRC and ROC) improve their relationship economically and diplomatically, we think it should lower the likelihood of coercion or conflict
taking place.”16 He cautioned, however, that “there is very impressive
combat power across the Strait on mainland China . . . they continue to
improve their capabilities, so in terms of a balance of power, it’s generally one-sided.”17 The US Department of Defense’s 2013 report on
China’s military confirms that “dealing with a potential contingency in
the Taiwan Strait remains the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) primary
mission despite decreasing tensions there.”18 It warns that “preparation
for a Taiwan conflict with the possibility of US intervention has largely
dominated China’s military modernization program.”19
Indeed, the PLA budget has been trending upward for decades. In
2012, the US Department of Defense estimated that China’s military
budget could have been as high as $180 billion in 2011—double the
stated budget (the declared budget is $116.2 billion for 2013).20 In 2010,
Robert Gates, then US Secretary of Defense, characterized the military
build-up directly opposite Taiwan as an “extraordinary” deployment.21
It represents the highest concentration of missiles anywhere on earth,
and holds the potential to “destroy key leadership facilities, military
bases and communication and transportation nodes with minimal advance
warning [emphasis added].”22 The PLA is also boosting its military
prowess by developing new anti-ship ballistic missiles, torpedo and
mine systems, and combat aircraft. Such considerations led one study to
warn that “the PLA’s air and conventional missile capabilities could now
endanger US military forces and bases in the region should Washington
decide to intercede on Taiwan’s behalf.”23
14     Xiao An, “US’ Arms Sales to Taiwan Impede Sino-US Relationship,” China.org.cn, January 17,
2013, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-01/17/content_27716480.htm
15     Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990, 18; “US Assessing Sale of Fighters, Subs to
Taiwan,” China Post, February 1, 2010, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/nationalnews/2010/02/01/243094/US-assessing.htm.
16     “US Commander Predicts Stable Cross-Strait Relations,” China Post, March 4, 2012, http://
www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2012/03/04/333538/US-commander.
htm.
17     Ibid.
18     Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, May 2013), p.4.
19     Ibid., 57-58.
20     Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990, 33.
21     Ibid, 30.
22     Ibid.
23    US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Report to Congress (Washington,
DC: US GPO, November 2010), http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_
full_10.pdf.
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Nonetheless, Taiwan’s defense budgets have remained flat. The
shift to an all-volunteer force will mean that a large share of military
resources must be allocated to cover personnel costs. Military equipment
is growing old and obsolete. Particularly worrisome is the state of the
ROC Air Force. Its inventory includes 56 Mirage 2000, 145 F-16 A/B,
126 IDFs, and 60 F-5E/F fighters. According to a Defense Intelligence
Agency study, many of these warplanes “are incapable of operating
effectively.”24 Another report estimates that “by 2020, Taiwan’s fighters
would drop in number by 70% without new F-16s, and by 50% with 66
new F-16s.”25 It is clear that Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that
of the PRC has not been maintained.
There is a range of options available to a US administration that
wishes to address the growing military imbalance. This study examines
the four most obvious options and their consequences: (1) reduce or
terminate arms sales and security ties with Taiwan, (2) maintain the
present policy of boosting Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, (3) increase
those capabilities with new arms transfers, and (4) broker a deal with the
PRC to reduce military deployments in the Taiwan Strait.

Option 1: Reduce or Terminate Security Ties

Some are calling on Washington to terminate security support for
Taiwan. Admiral Bill Owens (ret.), former Vice-Chairman of the US
Joint Chiefs of Staff, has criticized arms sales to Taiwan as “not in our
best interest” and suggested that “a thoughtful review of this outdated
legislation [the TRA] is warranted.”26 Ambassador Chas Freeman (ret.)
has argued that the TRA compels US decisionmakers to “confront the
necessity to choose between the self-imposed shackles of longstanding
policy and the imperatives of our long-term strategic interests.”27 Others
have suggested “the US should consider backing away from its commitments to Taiwan.”28
Admittedly, terminating arms sales and reducing America’s security
commitment to Taiwan would benefit US interests in some ways. The
change in policy “would remove the most obvious and contentious flash
point between the US and China and smooth the way for better relations
between them in the decades to come.”29 The likelihood for US conflict
with China would decrease, while possibly increasing the prospects
for cooperation in numerous fields—ranging from global warming to
nuclear proliferation. Editorials in the PRC press even laud the “increasing number of far sighted Americans calling for repeal of the TRA.”30
This option would also reduce the likelihood that sensitive US military
technologies or weapons systems might fall into the hands of the PRC.
24     See Dean Cheng, “Getting Serious About Taiwan’s Air Power Needs,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder, Number 2616, October 14, 2011, 5
25     Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990, 23.
26     Bill Owens, “America Must Start Treating China as A Friend,” Financial Times, November 17,
2009, http://www.ft.com.
27     Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Beijing, Washington, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige (Newport, RI: China
Maritime Studies Institute, May 10, 2011).
28     Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,”
Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2011, 87.
29     Ibid.
30     Peng Guangqian, “US should abolish ‘Taiwan Relations Act,” People’s Daily (Overseas Edition),
September 26, 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/7605019.html.
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As some Pentagon officials admit, military exchanges with Taiwan are
riskier “in an environment of improving Taiwan-PRC ties.”31
However, this option might jeopardize America’s credibility with
important allies—particularly Japan or South Korea. It could also raise
questions about America’s commitment to democracy in other countries
or regions of the world. Ironically, the move could raise questions about
America’s trustworthiness. As President Ronald Reagan explained in
1984, “I myself have said to some representatives of the PRC that we
would think that they would have more confidence in us if they knew
that we didn’t discard one friend in order to make another. That should
indicate to them that we’d be a good friend to them too.”32
Any move to downgrade military links with Taiwan would surely
generate domestic political fallout. Even PRC authorities acknowledge
the Obama administration is under pressure to sell arms to Taiwan and
cannot easily cut off the island.33 Coming at a time when members of
both major political parties are calling for Washington to enhance ties
with Taipei, and when public opinion polls show many Americans still
hold negative views of the PRC, an administration would have to be prepared for criticism. Conceivably, terminating America’s security support
for Taiwan could cause some independence activists in Taiwan to take
more aggressive steps to achieve their goal. In other words, the problem
with this option is that there could be many unintended consequences.

Option 2: Maintain the Present Policy

The Obama administration has no plans to cut defense ties with
Taiwan. US officials have reiterated this position repeatedly. In June
2013, President Obama reiterated his commitment “to Taiwan under
the TRA including providing defensive weapons.”34 Officials acknowledge a “fighter gap” between Taiwan and the PRC, and the “growing
military threat to Taiwan.”35 Thus far, Obama has approved two arms
sales packages, and his “administration has sold over $12 billion in
arms to Taiwan,” which compares favorably to any period in US-Taiwan
relations since the TRA.36 He will not rule out future sales. Sales in
2010 included much-needed PAC-3 “Patriot” missiles for Taiwan’s air
defenses, while the most notable portion of the 2011 package was its
provision for an upgrade for Taiwan’s F-16 A/B fighter fleet. US officials
explain the upgrade package is extensive and will “provide improved
combat capability, survivability, and reliability to Taiwan’s 145 F-16 A/B

31     Kerry Dumbaugh, Taiwan-Us Relations: Recent Developments and Their Policy Implications,
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 7, 2009), 18.
32     Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “America’s Two Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan,” Asian
Survey, 28, no. 8 (August, 1988): 895.
33     Andrew Jacobs, “Arms Sale Draws Angry, But Familiar, Reaction,” The New York Times,
September 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
34    Kelven Huang and Jamie Wang, “Defense Ministry Urges US to Continue Arms Sales to
Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan, June 9, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201306090005.aspx;“Xi
Urges US to Cease Taiwan Arms Sales,” Taipei Times, June 10, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/
News/front/archives/2013/06/10/2003564416.
35     Viola Gienger, “Taiwan Weighed for US Jet Sale at Risk of Riling China,” Bloomberg, April 27,
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com
36     US Department of State, Background Briefing: Notification to Congress on the Sale of Arms to Taiwan,
Special Briefing via Teleconference (Washington, DC: September 21, 2011) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2011/09/172936.htm.
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aircraft” and point out the deal also includes “an extension of the F-16
pilot training program.”37
Critics suspect that the F-16 upgrade decision was adopted to
limit the political fallout from China at a time when the United States
seeks Beijing’s cooperation on a range of international issues. In fact,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R.-FL), then Chair of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed the agreement is “woefully inadequate” and that it “has Beijing’s fingerprints all over it.”38 Representative
David Rivera, (R-FL), charged that the administration was “kowtowing” to China, and “has clearly been pressured by the Chinese to control
Taiwan and Taiwan policy in every way possible.”39 Senator John Cornyn
(R.-TX) said the upgrade decision reflected the administration’s “capitulation to Communist China.”40 Legislation has been introduced in
Congress to compel the administration to sell additional arms—including F-16 C/D fighters—to Taiwan. Such measures are included in both
the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 and the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
On the other hand, officials claim that the upgrade decision was
“a smart defense policy—it makes a real and immediate contribution
to Taiwan’s security.”41 The deal was described as a low-cost alternative
for what is “essentially, the same quality” warplane as the F-16 C/D
and notes that “we’re obviously prepared to consider further sales in
the future.”42 It is also noteworthy that reaction to the F-16 upgrade
was so low-key in Beijing (and Taipei) that Lin Chong-pin, a leading
authority on cross-strait relations, speculated that “the whole thing suggested that Washington, Beijing and Taipei in a way all have consulted
with each other.”43 While that is unclear, what is clear is that, under the
current policy, obsolete warplanes will not be replaced, while F-16s will
be pulled out of service for extensive periods of time to be upgraded.

Option 3: Increase Military Support

This option is attractive to those who believe the Obama administration’s provisions for Taiwan’s security cannot meet the island’s
defense needs. Representative Ros-Lehtinen and others are pushing the
Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 (TPA) in an effort to strengthen American
military support for Taiwan. If the TPA (or similar legislation) is passed
and signed into law, it would almost provide Taiwan with carte blanche for
procurement of US arms. The TPA’s provisions include the sale of F-16
C/D warplanes (in addition to the upgrade of the F-16 A/B fighters),
modern surface-to air-missiles, vertical and short take-off and landing
37     Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of the US Department of State’s Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in Why Taiwan
Matters, Part II, October 4, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ris/rm/2011/10/174980.htm.
38    William Lowther, “Taiwan to Receive US Arms Package,” Taipei Times, September 23, 2011,
www.taipeitimes.com.
39     Shaun Tandon, “US Lawmakers Press for Jets to Taiwan,” Google News, June 16, 2011, http://
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmEFoHVmRMs005btF9KevBUH1VhQ?do
cId=CNG.e0a7053e6c093f750ec8db0f1cc01cc0.311.
40     Stokes and Hachigian, US-China Relations in an Election Year, 26.
41     William Wan and Keith B Richburg, “Administration Defends Arms Package for Taiwan,” The
Washington Post, September 20, 2011, in Lexis/Nexis.
42     Ibid.
43     Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Analysis: F-16 Decision Shows “Balanced Strategy,” Analysts Say,” Taipei Times,
October 9, 2011, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/10/09/2003515301.
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(V/STOL) combat aircraft, “cost effective” submarines, three guided
missile frigates, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, global positioning
system (GPS)-guided short-range rockets, unmanned air vehicles, radar,
and jamming equipment.
If the United States opted to provide Taiwan with all the weapons
the ROC desires, one of America’s oldest friends might be assured
of a “sufficient self-defense capability.” This could enable Taipei to
negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength, not weakness. The
additional military muscle would also give any potential adversary,
including the PRC, cause to calculate whether an attack on Taiwan is
worth the risks—deterrence would be enhanced. Should deterrence fail,
the new arms would provide Taiwan with a boost during any military
campaign. Moreover, American lawmakers and defense contractors
have speculated that substantial economic benefits would accrue to the
United States in the event of a massive arms sale. Finally, proponents of
massive arms transfers assert that, while Beijing might complain or temporarily suspend military-to-military contacts with Washington, “past
behavior indicates that China is unlikely to challenge any fundamental
US interests in response to any future releases of significant military
articles or services to Taiwan.”44 “The Perryman Group estimates that
the Lockheed Martin Taiwan F-16 program would generate some $8.7
billion in output (gross product) and more than 87,651 person-years of
employment in the US.”45
To be sure, a sharp escalation in arms sales could advance US interests in some ways. However, any US administration must be prepared
for a negative reaction from the PRC. This response could range from
a suspension in US-PRC military-to-military contacts to a break in diplomatic relations. Beijing might even sell arms to states unfriendly to
American interests. After the US sold 150 F-16 A/B fighters to Taiwan
in 1992, for instance, “China transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan and
reached a formal agreement with Iran to cooperate on nuclear energy,
thus breaking its February 1, 1992 promise to abide by the terms of the
MCTR.”46
In addition, Taiwan may not have the resources to buy the weapons.
Taipei apparently finds it difficult to purchase the arms sales offered
in 2010 and 2011. Adding 66 new F-16 C/D fighters to the tab would
not make it any easier to pay the bill.47 Moreover, where will the submarines and U/STOL aircraft come from? The United States stopped
manufacturing diesel submarines decades ago, and it could be a decade
before F-35-B Joint Strike Fighters are available for export. Finally, US
44     US-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute, Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales,
(Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, March 2012), http://project2049.net/documents/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf.
45     Perryman Group, An Assessment of the Potential Impact of the Lockheed Martin Taiwan F-16
Program on Business Activity in Affected States and Congressional Districts (Waco, TX : Perryman Group,
May 2011), http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2011_may_perryman_group_taiwan_f-16_economic_impact_report.pdf.
46     Robert S. Ross, “The Bush Administration: The Origins of Engagement,” in Making China
Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, eds. Ramon Myers, Michel Oksenberg, and
David Shambaugh (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 32.
47     J. Michael Cole, “Difficult Choices Faced on F-16 Deals,” Taipei Times, May 7, 2012, www.
taipeitimes.com; J. Michael Cole, “Abandon F-16s, Seek F-35s: Senior Military Officials,” Taipei Times,
May 8, 2012, www.taipeitimes.com; Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Might Delay F-16 Upgrade,” Defense
News, May 5, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120505/DEFREG03/305050002/
Taiwan-Might-Delay-F-16-Upgrade.
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officials must consider domestic politics in China. As Gary Locke, US
Ambassador to China, observed, the political situation in the PRC is
“very, very delicate.”48 Decisionmakers must consider whether a spike in
arms sales might create tremors in Chinese politics, perhaps weakening
the position of the present leaders in Beijing.

Option 4: Negotiation, Compromise, and Arms Control

If a US administration opted to pursue this option, it could use
arms sales as bargaining chips.49 The administration might explore the
possibility of reaching an agreement similar to that proposed by thenPresident Jiang Zemin when visiting with President Bush in Crawford,
Texas, in 2002. Namely, Washington would agree not to sell new fighters, submarines, and other advanced arms to Taiwan in exchange for the
removal of the missiles (and their infrastructure) that China has deployed
directly opposite Taiwan. According to media reports, Chang Wanquan,
PRC Defense Minister, raised a similar proposal when meeting with
Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of Defense, on 19 August 2013.50
This initiative may yield numerous dividends. First, it is likely
Beijing would consider this proposal because removal of the missiles
would generate goodwill among the Taiwanese, and the weapons could
no longer be cited by local politicians as evidence of Beijing’s hostility.
Public opinion polls reveal that a large percentage of Taiwanese believe
Beijing is hostile to both the ROC government and the island’s population.51 President Ma has stated “the mainland should remove or actually
dismantle all the missiles that are targeted against Taiwan, otherwise we
won’t be interested in making further steps to negotiate a peace agreement with them.”52
Second, it is clear the PRC will consider removing the missiles as
part of a deal with the United States. As noted, President Jiang first raised
the idea with President Bush. According to Chinese media accounts, the
PLA has been debating the question of whether to withdraw the missiles
opposite Taiwan for years. On 22 September 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao
conceded that the missiles would “eventually” be removed. Prominent
PRC political analysts with links to Beijing have responded favorably to
such a proposal.53
Third, Washington has telegraphed its willingness to reduce arms
sales if Beijing removes its missiles. For example, in 2004, one highranking US official said that if the PLA’s military “posture” opposite
Taiwan appears more peaceful, “it follows logically that Taiwan’s defense
48     
Josh Rogin, “US Ambassador: Political Situation in China ‘Very Very Delicate,’”
Foreign Policy, January 18, 2012, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/18/
us_ambassador_political_situation_in_china_very_very_delicate.
49     The author first raised this idea in an editorial. See Dennis V. Hickey, “How a Few F-16s Can
Buy Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” Los Angeles Times, November 11, 2009, A23.
50     “Beijing Should Renounce Use of Force to End US Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Want China
Times, August 27, 2013,http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1701&Main
CatID=17&id=20130827000004
51     Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, Summarized Results of the Public Opinion Survey
on “the Public’s View of Current Cross-Strait Relations, (March 30 to April 2, 2012), http://www.mac.gov.
tw/public/Data/2579302271.pdf.
52     “No Peace Unless China Removes Missiles: Ma”, China Post, April 7, 2010, http://www.
chinapost.com.tw.
53     Xu Shiquan, “US Arms Sales to Taiwan: Better to Assess the Costs and Recalculate,” China–
US Focus, September 15, 2011, htttp://www.chinafocus.com/print/?id+10136
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requirements will change.”54 Indeed, Mark Stokes, a former Pentagon
official has observed that, “it just makes sense: if the military threat was
reduced, of course it would have an effect on arms sales.”55
Fourth, Taiwan has indicated that it might not have an interest in
purchasing so many US arms if the PRC missiles are removed. After all,
they claim that arms purchases are linked directly to the threat posed by
the mainland. Removing the missiles could be considered a “confidence
building measure” because it promotes stability and “would increase
warning time and thus build confidence.”56
If a US administration chose to negotiate a deal to reduce arms
deployments in the Taiwan Strait, it would have prepare the stage. The
American armaments industry would oppose such an initiative. Arms
sales to Taiwan are viewed by some as an economic stimulus plan, and
lawmakers unabashedly describe the weapons transfers in terms of jobs
generated for American workers. In short, the arms merchants and their
allies will employ a full court press to derail any movement toward arms
control in the Taiwan Strait.
Some politicians, academics, and media pundits will condemn any
discussions between the United States and the PRC about arms sales to
Taiwan, a reduction in arms sales, or any concrete moves toward arms
control. The fact the United States has repeatedly held such discussions
with China is ignored, and there is no mention of the pledge in the 17
August 1982 US-China Joint Communiqué to reduce arms sales. Rather,
the administration will be told “it can’t be done.” The fact that a fourth
US-China Communiqué might be drafted, the TRA amended, or yet
another “assurance” provided, is likewise ignored.
Some analysts claim any agreement is useless because the missiles
will not be destroyed. After all, the missiles could be returned to the
coast, or the PLA could attack Taiwan with longer range missiles. Some
high-ranking PLA military brass agree on this point. As Major General
Luo Yuan (PLA-ret.) and other retired high-ranking Chinese military
officers explained, “they could not understand why people in Taiwan
care so much about the withdrawal of missiles from China’s coastal areas
as Chinese missiles are capable of hitting Taiwan even if launched from
Xinjiang in China’s northwest.”57
Another issue associated with removal of missiles from China’s
coastline is where will the missiles will be redeployed. During conversations with the author, PRC academics and officials repeatedly raised this
issue. As one analyst observed, no matter where the Chinese missile brigades and their infrastructure are sent—closer to South Korea, Japan,
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India, or Russia—“you are going to have some extremely antagonized
neighbors.”58

Conclusions

In recent years, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has
shifted steadily in Beijing’s favor. In 2011, Taiwan’s Ministry of National
Defense acknowledged that the PLA now possesses the capability to
blockade the Taiwan Strait or conquer the ROC’s offshore islands.
Pro-Beijing publications in Hong Kong boast that “the PLA has long
had absolute strength to seize the command of the air over the Taiwan
Straits and is also strong enough to blockade the Taiwan Strait with its
shore-based long-range anti-ship and ground-to-air missiles.”59
Unfortunately, the growing military imbalance across the Taiwan
Strait presents decisionmakers with a situation in which it is difficult
to arrive at a balanced policy. According to the 2010 National Security
Strategy, the United States, “will continue to pursue a positive, constructive and comprehensive relationship with China. . . . [and it]
will encourage continued reduction in tension between the PRC and
Taiwan.”60 The Obama administration also stated that “in the period
ahead, we seek to encourage more dialogue and exchanges between the
two sides, as well as reduced military tensions and deployments, and we have
and will continue to meet our responsibilities under the TRA [emphasis
added].61
Since American policy regarding Taiwan’s security is based upon a
network of laws, joint communiqués, assurances, statements, and secret
promises, decisionmakers must take care to ensure this network does
not become a system of “self-imposed shackles.”
Sponsoring legislation to amend or revoke the TRA is not the answer
to the predicament confronting Washington. The exercise of this option
would undermine American credibility and possibly create tension
within the US Congress. Although the prospects for conflict appear
dim, cutting US military support for Taiwan “could create opportunities
and incentives for Beijing’s political and military leadership to assume
greater risk in cross-strait relations.”62 It might also prompt Taipei to
accelerate development of its own anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air,
air-to-air, and ballistic missiles. Even the long-dormant program to
develop weapons of mass destruction might be revived.
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Similarly, providing Taiwan with carte blanche for procurement of US
weaponry is risky. Many of those supporting this option view arms sales
as an economic stimulus plan. One newspaper headline even trumpeted,
“Selling F-16s to Taiwan Equals Jobs.”63 The military imblance in the
Taiwan Strait is also employed as a means to launch partisan political
attacks.
Selling scores of expensive military hardware to Taiwan—including submarines, F-16 C/D fighters, F-35-B Joint Strike Fighters, and
a wide array of missiles—would solve little. As noted, the island is
having difficulties purchasing the equipment offered. Moreover, it is not
clear whether Taipei really wants these weapons.64 This option would
not encourage cross-strait dialogue and exchanges or reduce military
tensions and deployments—declared objectives of US foreign policy.
Rather, it would likely do the opposite.
For the reasons above, the United States should pursue both Option
2 and Option 4. The present policy (Option 2) enables Taipei to bolster
its air defenses with upgraded F-16 A/B fighters, PAC-3 “Patriot” missiles and other arms. It also sends a powerful message to Beijing without
being too provocative while retaining the option for future arms sales.
However, Option 2 does not go far enough toward reducing the military
imbalance or promoting reconciliation. Washington should immediately
seek to negotiate a reduction in military deployments with Beijing (and
Taipei). It should agree not to sell new fighters, submarines, or other
advanced arms to Taiwan in exchange for the removal of the missiles
(and their infrastructure) that China has deployed directly opposite
Taiwan. The redeployment would increase warning time and help build
confidence. It might even be considered as the first step toward a global
ban on short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs).
In short, Option 4 helps reduce the chances for conflict and increases
the prospects for the development of peaceful relations between Taiwan
and the PRC. It might even help lay the groundwork for other confidence
building measures. To be sure, it would require some new thinking—
particularly among some US bureaucrats and those in the arms industry.
And it would also require new thinking in China—especially among
officers in the PLA. Such an initiative, however, could yield handsome
dividends and is worth the effort.
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